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Abstract. We study the scheduling problem on unrelated machines in the mechanism
design setting. This problem was proposed and studied in the seminal paper of Nisan and
Ronen [NR99], where they gave a 1.75-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for
the case of two machines. We improve this result by a 1.6737-approximation randomized
truthful mechanism. We also generalize our result to a 0.8368m-approximation mechanism
for task scheduling with m machines, which improve the previous best upper bound of
0.875m[MS07].
1. Introduction
Mechanism design has become an active area of research both in Computer Science and
Game Theory. In the mechanism design setting, players are selfish and wish to maximize
their own utilities. To deal with the selfishness of the players, a mechanism should both
satisfy some game-theoretical requirements such as truthfulness and some computational
properties such as good approximation ratio. The study of their algorithmic aspect was ini-
tiated by Nisan and Ronen in their seminal paper “Algorithmic Mechanism Design” [NR99].
The focus of that paper was on the scheduling problem on unrelated machines, for which the
standard mechanism design tools ( VCG mechanisms [Clarke71, Groves1973, Vickrey61])do
not suffice. They proved that no deterministic mechanism can have an approximation ratio
better than 2 for this problem. This bound is tight for the case of two machines. How-
ever if we allow randomized mechanisms, this bound can be beaten. In particular they
gave a 1.75-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for the case of two machines.
Since then, many researchers have studied the scheduling problem on unrelated machines in
mechanism design setting [JP99, Sourd01, SS02, SX02, GMW07, CKV07, CKK07, MS07].
However their mechanism remains the best to the best of our knowledge. In a recent paper
[MS07], Mu’alem and Schapira proved a lower bound of 1.5 for this setting. So to explore the
exact bound between 1.5 and 1.75 is an interesting open problem in this area. In this paper,
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we improve the upper bound from 1.75 to 1.6737. Formally we give a 1.6737-approximation
randomized truthful mechanism for task scheduling with two machines. Using similar tech-
niques of [MS07], we also generalize our result to a 0.8368m-approximation mechanism for
task scheduling with m machines.
Let us describe the problem more carefully. There are m machines and n tasks, and
each machine is controlled by an agent. We use tij to denote the running time of task j
on machine i, which is also called the type value of the agent(machine) i on task j. The
objective is to minimize the completion time of the last assignment (the makespan). Unlike
in the classical optimization problem, the scheduling designer does not know tij . Each selfish
agent i holds his/her own type values (the tijs). In order to motivate the agents to report
their true value tijs, the mechanism needs to pay the agents. So a mechanism consists of
an allocation algorithm and a payment algorithm. A mechanism is called truthful when
telling one’s true value is among the optimal strategies for each agent, no matter how other
agents behave. Here the utility of each agent is the payment he/she gets minus the load of
tasks allocated to his/her machine. When randomness is involved, there are two versions of
truthfulness: in the stronger version, i.e. universally truthfulness, the mechanism remains
truthful even if the agents know the random bits; in the weaker version, i.e. truthfulness
in expectation, an agent maximizes his/her expected utility by telling the true type value.
Our mechanisms proposed in this paper are universally truthful.
Now we can talk about the high level idea of the technical part. Here we only talk
about the allocation algorithms, and the corresponding payment algorithms, which make
the mechanism truthful, will be given later. First we describe Nisan and Ronen’s mechanism
[NR99]. In their mechanism, each task is allocated independently. For a particular task j,
if the two values t1j and t
2
j are relatively close to each other, say t
1
j/t
2
j ∈ [3/4, 4/3], then
they allocate task j randomly to machine 1 or 2 with equal probability; if one is much
higher then the other, say t1j/t
2
j > 4/3 or t
2
j/t
1
j > 4/3, the task j is allocated to the more
efficient machine. The main idea of our mechanism is to partition the tasks into three
categories rather than two. So we need two threshold values, say α, β, where 1 < β < α
and a biased probability r , where 1/2 < r < 1. If the two values are relatively close to
each other, say t1j/t
2
j ∈ [1/β, β], or one is much higher then the other, say t1j/t2j > α or
t2j/t
1
j > α , we do the same things as Nisan and Ronen’s mechanism. In the remaining
case, one is significantly larger than the other, but however still does not dominate, say
t1j/t
2
j ∈ [β, α] or t2j/t1j ∈ [β, α]. In this case, we allocate the task j to the more efficient
one with a higher probability r (r > 1/2) and the less efficient one with a lower probability
1 − r. The mechanism is quite simple, so it is very computationally efficient. Intuitively
our mechanism will give better approximation ratios by choosing suitable parameters α, β
and r. This is indeed true. We can prove an improved approximation ratio of 1.6737 by
choosing α = 1.4844, β = 1.1854, r = 0.7932. However, the proof is quite involved. One
reason is that the situation for the new case (middle case) is more complicated than the
original two. The main reason is that their approach becomes infeasible in the analysis
of our mechanism. The proof in Nisan and Ronen’s paper is basically case by case, but
unfortunately the number of subcases increases double exponentially with the number of
task types. So we introduce some substantial new proof techniques to overcome this. We
also think this techniques may further improve the upper bound.
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1.1. Related Work
Scheduling on unrelated machines is one of the most fundamental scheduling Prob-
lems. For this NP-hard optimization problem, there is a polynomial time algorithm with
approximation ratio of 2[LST87]. Especially if the number of machines is bounded by
some constant, Angel, Bampis and Kononov gave an FPTAS[ABK01]. However there is no
corresponding payment strategy to make either of the above allocation algorithms truthful.
The study of this problem in the mechanism design setting is initiated by Nisan and
Ronen. In their paper [NR99], they gave a 1.75-approximation randomized truthful mecha-
nism for two machines. This result was generalized by Mu’alem and Schapira to a 0.875m-
approximation randomized mechanism for m machines[MS07]. We improved the two upper
bounds to 1.6737 and 0.8368m respectively.
For the lower bound side, Nisan and Ronen gave a lower bound of 2 for deterministic
version. This bound was improved by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali to 1+
√
2 for
3 or more machines [CKV07]. For the randomized version, Mu’alem and Schapira gave a
lower bound of 2 − 1/m[MS07]. This also holds for the weaker notion of truthfulness, i.e.,
truthfulness in expectation.
Lavi and Swarmy considered a restricted variant, where each task j only has two values
of running time , and gave a 3-approximation randomized truthful mechanism [LS07]. They
first use the cycle monotonicity in designing mechanisms.
In [CKK07], Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kova´cs considered the fractional version
of this problem, in which each task can be split among the machines. For this version, they
gave a lower bound of 2−1/m and an upper bound of (m+1)/2. We remark that these two
bounds are closed for the case of two machines as in the integral deterministic version. So
to explore the exact bound for the randomized version seems very interesting and desirable.
We believe that our work in this paper is an important step toward this objective.
2. Problem and Definitions
In this section we review some definitions and results on mechanism design and sched-
uling problem. More details can be found in[NR99].
In a mechanism design problem, there are usually some resources to distribute among
n agents. Every agent i has a type value ti, which denotes his/her preference on the
resources. Let t = (ti)i∈[m] denote the vector of all agents’ type values and t
−i denote the
vector of all agents’ type vectors except agent i’s. Receiving all the type values t from
agents, the mechanism will produce an output o(t) = (x(t), p(t)). Here x(t) specifies the
allocation of the resources and is produced by an allocation algorithm. p(t) specifies the
payment to agents and is produced by an payment algorithm. Every agent i has a valuation
vi(x, ti), which describe his/her preference on the output allocation. The agent i’s objective
is maximizing his/her utility function ui, where ui = vi +pi, and pi is the payment obtained
from the mechanism. The mechanism’s objective is to maximize an objective function
g(o, t). Formally, we have the following definitions.
Definition 2.1. A mechanism is a pair of Algorithms M = (X,P ).
• Allocation Algorithm X: Its input is m agents’ type vectors, t1, t2, · · · , tm, which are
reported by the agents. and its output is x = (x1, · · · , xm), where xi = (xij)j∈[n] ∈
{0, 1}n are allocation vector of agent i.
530 P. LU AND C. YU
• Payment Algorithm P : It outputs a payment vector p = (p1, · · · , pm), which de-
pends both on agents’ type vectors and allocation vectors produced by allocation
algorithm.
A mechanism is deterministic if both the allocation algorithm and payment algorithm
are deterministic. When at least one of them uses random bits, it is called a randomized
mechanism.
In order to increase utility, an agent may lie when reporting his/her type values. But
for some mechanisms, no agent can increase his/her utility by lying. This nice property of
a mechanism is called truthfulness. We give the formal definitions of truthfulness.
Definition 2.2. A deterministic mechanism is truthful iff for every agent, reporting
his/her true type values is among the best strategies to maximize his/her utility, no matter
how other agents acts. A randomized mechanism is truthful in expectation iff no agent
can increase his/her expected utility by lying. A randomized mechanism is universally
truthful iff it remains truthful even if the agents know the random bits.
From now on, we will only focus on truthful mechanisms. The most important pos-
itive result in mechanism design is generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism
[Vickrey61, Groves1973, Clarke71]. Many known truthful mechanisms are all in VCG fam-
ily. The mechanisms of VCG family usually apply to mechanism design problem in which
the objective function is the (weighted) sum of all agents’ valuations. To be formal, we have
Definition 2.3. [NR99] A mechanism M = (X,P ) belongs to weighted VCG family if
there are real numbers(weights) β1, · · · , βn > 0, such that:
(1) the problem’s objective function satisfies g(o, t) =
∑
i β
ivi(ti, o).
(2) o(t) ∈ argmaxo(g(o, t).
(3) pi(t) = 1
βi
∑
i′ 6=i β
i′vi
′
(ti
′
, o(t)) + hi(t−i), where hi() is an arbitrary function of t−i.
Theorem 2.4. ([Roberts79]) A weighted VCG mechanism is truthful.
Now we specify these mechanism notions in the problem of scheduling unrelated ma-
chines. Assume there are n tasks to be allocated to m machines, each of which is controlled
by an agent. Each agent i’s type value is ti = (tij)j∈[n], where t
i
j denotes the time to perform
task j on machine i.
We use a binary array xi = (xij)j∈[n] to specify the allocation of tasks to machine i.
xij is 1 if task j is allocated to machine i and otherwise 0. Let x = (x
i)i∈[m] denote the
allocation of all the tasks. For an allocation x, agent i’s valuation is v i = −xi · ti, where
xi · ti = ∑nj=1 xijtij .
Definition 2.5. Given any allocation x of the tasks, the longest running time of the ma-
chines is called the makespan of the allocation. Formally, makespan(x) = maxi∈[m]x
i · ti.
The objective of the mechanism is to minimize the (expected) makespan of the alloca-
tion. This is not the (weighted) sum of all agents’ valuations. So we can not apply VCG
mechanism here. However, we remark that if there is only one task, the makespan can be
viewed as the sum of all agents’ valuations. We will use this observation in our analysis.
From [NR99] and [MS07], we know that there is no optimal truthful mechanism for this
problem, even if we allow super-polynomial running time and randomness. So we will try
to find a truthful mechanism with good approximation ratio.
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Definition 2.6. Let tM (t) be the (expected) makespan of the mechanism M on instances t
and topt(t) be the optimal makespan of instance t. We say mechanism M has approximation
ratio c iff for any instance t, tM (t)/topt(t) ≤ c.
3. Our Mechanism and the Analysis
In this section, we give a truthful scheduling mechanism for 2 machines case, and show
that its approximation ratio is 1.6737. Then we generalize our result to the m machines
case as in [MS07] and obtain a 0.8368m-approximation randomized truthful mechanism.
3.1. Generalized Randomly Biased Mechanism
Parameters: Real numbers α > β ≥ 1 > r ≥ 12 .
(Here we choose α = 1.4844, β = 1.1854, r = 0.7932.)
Input: The reported type vectors t = (t1, t2).
Output: A randomized allocation x = (x1, x2),
and a payment p = (p1, p2).
Allocation and Payment algorithm:
x1j ← 0, x2j ← 0, j = 1, 2 · · · , n; p1 ← 0; p2 ← 0.
For each task j = 1, 2 · · · , n do
sj ←


α, with probability 1− r,
β, with probability r − 1/2,
1/β, with probability r − 1/2,
1/α, with probability 1− r.
if t1j < sjt
2
j ,
x1j = 1, p
1 ← p1 + sjt2j ;
else
x2j = 1, p
2 ← p2 + s−1j t1j .
Theorem 3.1. The Generalized Randomly Biased Mechanism (GBM for short) is univer-
sally truthful and can achieve a 1.6737-approximation solution for task scheduling with two
machines.
We will prove this theorem in the following two subsections. In 3.2, we will prove that
our mechanism is universally truthful. Then we analyze its approximation ratio in 3.3
3.2. Truthfulness
Lemma 3.2. The Generalized Randomly Biased Mechanism is universally truthful.
Proof. To prove that the GBM is universally truthful, we only need to prove that it is
truthful when the random sequence sj is fixed. Since the utility of an agent equals the sum
of the utilities obtained from each task and our mechanism is task-independent, we only
need consider the case of one task. In this case, say sj is fixed and there is only one task j,
the mechanism is exactly the VCG mechanism with weight (1, sj). Since a weighted VCG
is truthful, the GBM mechanism is universally truthful.
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3.3. Estimation of the Approximation Ratio
If this subsection, we will estimate the approximation ratio of our GBM mechanism.
Since we already proved that GBM is universally truthful in 3.2, we only need to focus on
the allocation algorithms of GBM. So we can restate the allocation algorithms for GBM
in an equivalent but more understandable way. Intuitively we should assign one task with
larger probability to the machine which has smaller type value(running time) on it. The
idea of our mechanism is to partition all the tasks into several types according to the ratio
of two agents’ type values. For different types of tasks, we use different biased probabilities
to allocate them. To be formal, we have the following definition.
Definition 3.3. For a task j, we call it an h-task iff
tij
t3−ij
> α for some i ∈ {1, 2}; we called
it an m-task iff β <
tij
t3−i
j
≤ α for some i ∈ {1, 2}; we call it an l-task if t
i
j
t3−i
j
≤ β for any
i ∈ {1, 2}.
Then, we have the following claim.
Claim 3.4. The GBM mechanism allocates the tasks in the same way as the following
allocating algorithm does.
• For h-task, we allocate it to the machine with lower type value.
• For m-task, we allocate it to the more efficient machine with probability r and to
the less efficient machine with probability 1− r.
• For l-task, we allocate it to two machines with equal probabilities.
Proof. For each task j, we consider the probability that it is allocated to machine 1 in GBM.
According to the ratio of
t1j
t2j
, we have the following 5 cases:
• Case 1: t1j ≥ αt2j , then Pr(x1j = 1) = 0
• Case 2: β ≤ t1j < αt2j , then Pr(x1j = 1) = 1− r
• Case 3: β−1 ≤ t1j < βt2j , then Pr(x1j = 1) = (1− r) + (r − 12) = 12
• Case 4: α−1 ≤ t1j < β−1t2j , then Pr(x1j = 1) = (1− r) + (r − 12) + (r − 12) = r
• Case 5: t2j < α−1t2j , then Pr(x1j = 1) = (1− r) + (r − 12) + (r − 12 ) + (1− r) = 1
The probabilities that task j is assigned to machine 1 by two algorithms are always the
same, so the lemma is true.
Remark 3.5. This claim only says that the (distribution of) allocation produced by the
two methods are the same. However if we use this allocation algorithm stated in the claim,
we can only make the mechanism truthful in expectation.
As in [NR99], we obtain the following crucial claim, which can help us cut the number
of tasks. The proof of this claim is similar , and we put it in the Appendix.
Claim 3.6. To analyze the performance of the generalized randomized biased mechanism,
we only need consider the following cases:
(1) For each h-task j, the ratio of the two machines’ type value is arbitrarily close to α.
So we can assume it equals α.
(2) If OPT allocates an l-task j to machine i, then t3−ij /t
i
j = β.
(3) If OPT allocates an m-task j to machine i which has smaller type value, then
t3−ij /t
i
j = α.
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(4) If OPT allocates an m-task j to machine i which has bigger type value, then
t3−ij /t
i
j = β
−1.
(5) One of the machines is more efficient than the other on all h-tasks. We assume it’s
machine 1.
(6) There are at most 8 tasks A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H. In OPT , tasks A,C,E,G are
allocated to machine 1, and the others to machine 2. Tasks A,B are h-tasks. Tasks
C,D,E, F are m-tasks and tasks G,H are l-tasks.
From the above analysis, we know that we only need to consider the reduced case as
described in Figure 1.
type task t1j t
2
j opt-alloc gbm-alloc(probability)
h1 A a αa 1 1 : 0
h2 B b αb 2 1 : 0
m11 C c αc 1 r : (1− r)
m12 D d βd 2 r : (1− r)
m21 E βe e 1 (1− r) : r
m22 F αf f 2 (1− r) : r
l1 G g βg 1
1
2 :
1
2
l2 H βh h 2
1
2 :
1
2
Figure 1: The Reduced Case.
Now we can estimate the approximation ratio based on this reduced case.
Lemma 3.7. The allocation produced by GBM is a 1.6737-approximation solution for the
task scheduling problem with two machines.
Proof. Let topt be the make-span of an optimal solution and let tgbm be the expected
makespan of allocations produced by GBM. We want to show that tgbm ≤ 1.6737topt.
From the allocation of the optimal solution, we have that
topt = max{a + c + βe + g, αb + βd + f + h}.
Now we will estimate the expected makespan of our mechanism tgbm. First we introduce
some notation which will be used in the following analysis. We will treat the same name X
(X = A,B, · · · ,H) as a random variable, which denotes the assignment of the task X. For
example, C = 2 means that our mechanism assigns the task C to the second machine. Then
the last column in Figure 1 can also be viewed as the distribution of the random variable
X (X = A,B, · · · ,H). For example Pr(C = 1) = r and Pr(C = 2) = 1 − r. Since our
mechanism assigns each task independently, the random variables are also independent of
each other. More precisely, for any X,Y ∈ {A,B, · · · ,H}, i, j ∈ {1, 2} and X 6= Y , we have
Pr(X = i, Y = j) = Pr(X = i)Pr(Y = j).
We use a random variable M to denote the machine finishing last. More precisely,
M = 1 means the completion time of the first machine is not earlier than the second
machine, otherwise we have M = 2.
Now we compute the contribution of each task to tgbm. Let the j-th task be X. Then
its contribution to tgbm contains two parts. First part is from t
1
j . t
1
j contributes to tgbm
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iff our mechanism assigns task X to 1 (e.t. X = 1) and the machine 1 finishes later (e.t.
M = 1). The situation for t2j is similar. To sum up, the contribution of the j-th task X to
tgbm is
Pr(M = 1, X = 1)t1j + Pr(M = 2, X = 2)t
2
j .
For example, the contribution of task C to tgbm is
Pr(M = 1, C = 1)c + αPr(M = 2, C = 2)c = (Pr(M = 1, C = 1) + αPr(M = 2, C = 2))c.
Similarly, we can compute the contribution of each task to tgbm easily. To simplify the
notation, we use Cx (x = a, b, · · · , h) to denote the coefficient of x in tgbm. So we have
tgbm = Caa + Cbb + Ccc + Cdd + Cee + Cff + Cgg + Chh.
where
Ca = Pr(M = 1),
Cb = Pr(M = 1),
Cc = Pr(M = 1, C = 1) + αPr(M = 2, C = 2),
Cd = Pr(M = 1, D = 1) + βPr(M = 2, D = 2),
Ce = βPr(M = 1, E = 1) + Pr(M = 2, E = 2),
Cf = αPr(M = 1, F = 1) + Pr(M = 2, F = 2),
Cg = Pr(M = 1, G = 1) + βPr(M = 2, G = 2),
Ch = βPr(M = 1,H = 1) + Pr(M = 2,H = 2).
Since
tgbm = Caa + Cbb + Ccc + Cdd + Cee + Cff + Cgg + Chh
= (Caa + Ccc +
Ce
β
βe + Cgg) + (
Cb
α
αb +
Cd
β
βd + Cff + Chh)
≤ max(Ca, Cc, Ce
β
,Cg)(a + c + βe + g) + max(
Cb
α
,
Cd
β
,Cf , Ch)(αb + βd + f + h)
≤ max(Ca, Cc, Ce
β
,Cg)topt + max(
Cb
α
,
Cd
β
,Cf , Ch)topt
So the performance of our mechanism is bounded by
max(Ca, Cc,
Ce
β
,Cg) + max(
Cb
α
,
Cd
β
,Cf , Ch).
We will give bound for every possible sum between {Ca, Cc, Ceβ , Cg} and {Cbα , Cdβ , Cf , Ch}.
First
Ca +
Cb
α
= Pr(M = 1) +
Pr(M = 1)
α
≤ 1 + 1
α
.
So Ca +
Cb
α
is bounded by 1 + 1
α
. Later we will choose suitable parameter α so that this
value is not too big.
Now we analyze a more complicated case, say Cc + Cf . Substituting Cc and Cf , we
have
Cc+Cf = Pr(M = 1, C = 1)+αPr(M = 2, C = 2)+αPr(M = 1, F = 1)+Pr(M = 2, F = 2).
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Here we use Pijk to denote the joint distribution of three random variables M,C,F (e.t.
Pijk = Pr(M = i, C = j, F = k) ). Then we can rewrite the formula as following
P111 + P112 + α(P221 + P222) + α(P111 + P121) + (P212 + P222).
Then we recombine the terms as following
(P111 + P112 + P212) + α(P111 + P121 + P221) + (1 + α)P222.
The first term is bounded by Pr(C = 1) (since Pr(C = 1) = P111 + P112 + P212 + P211);
similarly the second term is bounded by αPr(F = 1); the third term is bounded by (1 +
α)Pr(C = 2, F = 2). So we can bound Cc + Cf by
Pr(C = 1) + αPr(F = 1) + (1 + α)Pr(C = 2, F = 2)
= r + α(1 − r) + (1 + α)r(1− r) = 2r + α− r2 − αr2.
Similarly we can bound the remaining 14 sums as follows. Some of proofs are slightly
more complicated but all of them are along similar lines. We only list the bounds here, and
the details are omitted here due to the space limitation.
(1) Ca +
Cd
β
≤ 1 + r
β
.
(2) Ca + Cf ≤ 1 + (1− r)α.
(3) Ca + Ch ≤ 1 + β2 .
(4) Cc +
Cb
α
≤ 1 + 1
α
. (Here we use the assumption that α ≤ 1 + 1
α
.)
(5) Cc +
Cd
β
≤ r2
β
+ 1 + r2 + α− r + αr.
(6) Cc + Ch ≤ 12 + 12r + α− αr + 12βr.
(7) Ce
β
+ Cb
α
≤ 1 + 1
α
.
(8) Ce
β
+ Cd
β
≤ (1− r) + 1
β
r + (1 + 1
β
)r(1− r) ≤ Cc + Cf .
(9) Ce
β
+ Cf ≤ r2β + 1 + r2 + α− r + αr.
(10) Ce
β
+ Ch ≤ 1 + r2β + 12β − 12r.
(11) Cg +
Cb
α
≤ 1 + 1
α
. (Here we use the assumption that α ≤ 1 + 1
α
.)
(12) Cg +
Cd
β
≤ 1 + r2β + 12β − 12r.
(13) Cg + Cf ≤ 12 + 12r + α− αr + 12βr.
(14) Cg + Ch ≤ 34 + 34β.
To sum up, we have 9 different bounds: 1+ 1
α
, 2r+α−r2−αr2, 1+ r
β
, 1+(1−r)α, 1+ β2 ,
r2
β
+1+r2 +α−r+αr, 12 + 12r+α−αr+ 12βr, 1+ r2β + 12β− 12r, 34 + 34β, and one assumption
that α ≤ 1 + 1
α
. We want to choose suitable parameter α, β, r such that the assumption is
satisfied and the maximal bound is as small as possible. This can be easily done numerically
by a mathematical tool such as Matlab. We can choose α = 1.4844, β = 1.1854, r = 0.7932.
Substituting these values, we can verify that all the bounds are less than 1.6737. So we
proved that our mechanism has an approximate ratio of 1.6737.
3.4. An Improved Mechanism for m Machines
As an application of our main result, we turn to the case of m machines. In [NR99],
Nisan and Ronen gave a truthful deterministic mechanism that achieves an m-approximation.
Recently, Mu’alem and Schapira [MS07] generalized Nisan and Ronen’s truthful randomized
mechanism for 2 machines to the case of m machines. They partitioned the m machines into
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two sets of machines with equal size, S1 and S2. Then they construct a new instance with
only two machines, with type values tij = mina∈Sit
a
j , i = 1, 2. Applying the mechanism for 2
machines case, They showed a universally truthful randomized mechanism that obtains an
approximation of 0.875m. Using this idea and our improved result for two machines case,
we can improve the ratio from 0.875m to 0.8368m. To be self contained, we give the formal
description of the mechanism here. The proof is similar with [MS07] and omitted here.'
&
$
%
Parameters: real numbers α > β ≥ 1 > r ≥ 12 .
Input: the reported type value vectors t = (t1, t2, · · · , tm).
Output: an randomized allocation x = (x1, x2, · · · , xm) and a payment p =
(p1, p2, · · · , pm).
Mechanism:
(1) For each machine i, let xi ← ∅; pi ← 0.
(2) Partition the set of machines into two sets S1, S2 with equal size. If m is not
even, we can add an extra machine with infinite type values on every task.
(3) For each task j, Let ta = mini∈S1t
i
j , a = argmini∈S1t
i
j, t
a′ = mini∈S1−{a}t
i
j. Let
tb = mini∈S2t
i
j, b = argmini∈S1t
i
j, t
b′ = mini∈S1−{a}t
i
j.
(4) Apply our mechanism GBM for two machines case to machine a and b on task
j. Also the payment strategy need a little change. If a gets the task, and it will
gain a payment paj in GBM, then we pay it min{paj , ta
′
j }. If b gets the task, and
it will gain a payment pbj in GBM, then we pay it min{pbj , tb
′
j }. This change is in
order to keep the mechanism truthful.
Theorem 3.8. m-GBM is an universally truthful randomized mechanism for the scheduling
problem that obtains an approximation ratio of 0.8369m when choosing α = 1.4844, β =
1.1854, r = 0.7932.
4. Conclusions and Open Problems
This is the first improvement since Nisan and Ronen proposed the problem and the
1.75-mechanism. We believe it is possible to further improve the upper bound using our
technics. A direct open problem is to close the gap between the lower bound of 1.5 and our
new upper bound of 1.6737.
Another more important direction is to generalize the mechanisms for 2 machine to
mechanisms for m machines in a more clever way. In the general case, the gap between the
best lower bounds (constants) and the best upper bounds (Θ(m)) is huge both in determin-
istic and randomized versions. Any improvement in either direction is highly desirable.
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Appendix
Proof of Claim 3.6
(1) For h-task j, assume t1j < t
2
j . We can decrease t
2
j to αt
1
j , then tgbm will not change since
GBM always allocates task j to agent 1. But this may help OPT , so the approximation
ratio can only be worse.
(2) Increasing t3−ij to βt
i
j will not affect OPT but will increase tgbm. This is because the
probability to allocate j does not change as long as it is still an l-task, and one type value
is increased.
(3) It is similar with the above. We can keep increasing t3−ij while j is still m-task. Here
β ≤ t3−ij /tij ≤ α, so we can make it equal α.
(4) Here β−1 ≥ t3−ij /tij ≥ α−1, so we can increase t3−ij until this ratio equals β−1.
(5) This is the same as in [NR99]. We omit the proof here.
(6) Let ha, la, a ∈ {1, 2} denote an h-task or l-task respectively which is allocated to agent
a in OPT . Let mab , a, b ∈ {1, 2} denote an m-task allocated to agent b in OPT , on which
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agent a has smaller type value. So there are 8 types of tasks. We will prove that any two
task j1, j2 of the same type can be combined into a single task j of the same type. Firstly,
notice that j1, j2 have the same ratio of the two agents’ type values. so task j still has this
ratio, hence the same type. Further more, they are all allocated by GBM with the same
probability distribution.
In one direction, combining will leave topt unchanged. Obviously, combining can only
increase topt because any allocation obtained for the new instance can be get for the old
one. Also topt can be achieved for the new instance since two tasks of the same type are
allocated to the same agent.
In the other direction, combining can only increase tgbm.
For the h-task case, tgbm is also unchanged because GBM always allocate the h-tasks to the
more efficient agent.
For the m-task case, assume j1, j2 are both m
a
b , a, b ∈ {1, 2}. Let Y denote an allocation
of all the tasks except task j1, j2. Let tY,j1,j2 (resp.tY,j) denote the expected make-span when
j1, j2 (resp. j) are (is) allocated by GBM and all other tasks are allocated according to
Y . We have to show that tY,j1,j2 ≤ tY,j. Let T 1, T 2 denote finishing time of two agents
respectively when allocation is Y .
If agent i finishes last regardless of how j1, j2 are allocated, then
tY,j1,j2 = T
i + ri(t
i
j1
+ tij2) = tY,j
Here ri denotes the probability that j1, j2 and j are allocated to agent i. Otherwise, if agent
i finishes last iff both j1, j2 are allocated to it, then T
3−i ≤ T i + tij1 + tij2
tY,j1,j2
= r2i (T
i + tij1 + t
i
j2
) + ri(1− ri)(T 3−i + t3−ij1 + T 3−i + t3−ij2 ) + (1− ri)2(T 3−i + t3−ij1 + t3−ij2 )
≤ (r2i + ri(1− ri))(T i + tij1 + tij2) + ((1 − ri)2 + ri(1− ri))(T 3−i + t3−ij1 + t3−ij2 )
= ri(T
i + tij1 + t
i
j2
) + (1− ri)(T 3−i + t3−ij1 + t3−ij2 )
= tY,j
Finally assume that tij1 ≥ tij2 , i = 1, 2 and consider the last case where the agent to which
j1 is allocated finishes last. In this case
tY,j1,j2
= r2i (T
i + tij1 + t
i
j2
) + ri(1− ri)(T i + tij1)
+ ri(1− ri)T 3−i + t3−ij1 ) + (1− ri)2(T 3−i + t3−ij1 + t3−ij2 )
≤ (r2i + ri(1− ri))(T i + tij1 + tij2) + ((1− ri)2 + ri(1− ri))(T 3−i + t3−ij1 + t3−ij2 )
= ri(T
i + tij1 + t
i
j2
) + (1− ri)(T 3−i + t3−ij1 + t3−ij2 )
= tY,j
The l-task case is similar with m-task case, with ri =
1
2 .
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